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During the highly contested 2011–2012 election for the local regency head
(pilkada) in Pati, a successful trader and businessman had committed to serv-
ing as a broker (sabet) for one of the candidates. As a broker, Suparso (which
is a surname) acts as an intermediary for a candidate and attempts to recruit sup-
port among voters for his candidate, sometimes by providing gifts and even cash
payments in exchange for citizens’ support on Election Day.1 Suparso is also a
leader in his community and well respected by the citizens in his village. He is
often sought after by candidates running for local and even provincial elections
because of his influence over voters in the Central Java regency of Pati. During
the campaign, a rival candidate visited Suparso’s home numerous times attempt-
ing to convince him to abandon his candidate and defect to the rival campaign’s
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team (tim sukses or “success team”). The rival candidate made several offers that
included monetary incentives greater than what Suparso was currently being paid
and even, at one point, offered marriage agreements for their children. Despite
these significant financial incentives, Suparso remained loyal to his original can-
didate. Asked why he did not switch campaigns, Suparso adamantly stated in
Javanese, “aku wis nyanggupi calon kae, yo neng wong-wong raiku kekke ning
ndi,” (roughly translated as, “I have committed to this candidate and to the peo-
ple, how would I face them if I switched?”). While gaining significant financial
rewards for defection, in other words, Suparso also faced the prospect of dam-
aging his personal and business reputation within the community in which he
lived.
This paper explores the common dilemma facing many Indonesian vote bro-
kers that involves cross-pressure between significant financial (and often social)
rewards to betray their candidate, on the one hand, and the social pressure to main-
tain their reputations as leaders within their respective communities, on the other.
While defection and betrayal can be profitable for such brokers, in other words,
they also can carry a heavy social cost. Based on in-depth interviews and field
observations in two villages in the Central Java regencies of Pati and Demak from
2011–6, we find that personal and professional reputation, along with other forms
of social pressure, act as a mechanism compelling brokers to remain loyal to a
candidate once they commit to serving on that candidate’s success team. By intro-
ducing a social and cultural mechanism into explanations of brokerage activity,
we seek to build upon existing theoretical frameworks that place heavy focus on
economic and electoral factors.2 Economic and electoral factors do indeed provide
powerful incentives for brokers to betray their candidates, but brokers also act in
a social setting that can sometimes create counter-incentives to remain loyal. We
therefore argue that a more complete explanation of brokerage activity requires
the recognition that brokerage activity cannot be differentiated from the broker’s
place in society and the intersection of social norms and social relations in which
they live their daily lives.
In the sections below, we provide a background on brokerage activity and the
theoretical frameworks that help explain this activity in Indonesian elections. We
then describe the methods used for this study, including the selection of elections,
regencies, and brokers for our interviews and field observations. Then we turn
to our main findings from these interviews and field observations regarding the
role of social status and community reputations as a mechanism to explain why
some brokers who otherwise have a strong financial incentive to defect nonetheless
remain loyal to their candidate. Our analysis includes interviews with brokers,
candidates, and observations from the field regarding how brokers in these areas
sought to recruit support for their respective candidates. Finally, we discuss the
potential implications of this research for studies of vote-buying in Indonesia and
abroad.
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Brokerage Activity and Vote-Buying in Indonesia
Although Indonesia is a somewhat newer democracy, having transitioned from
the Suharto era in 1998, the election of village leaders can be traced back to
Dutch colonial rule. In fact, the practice of vote-buying and patronage politics
more broadly are thought to have begun at the village level well before Indonesia
declared itself an independent state in 1945.3 One village elder in the Pati regency
(who was 97 years old at the time) spoke about village elections during the Dutch
colonial era and had very clear recollections of the existence of brokers and their
role in these elections as mediators between the candidates and the voters.4 His-
torically, brokers used to operate as an indicator of social support for a candidate
running for village head. During the early years, brokers were not hired by the
candidates nor offered material incentives but instead represented factional sup-
port among the people over whom the brokers had influence.
It is difficult to trace the transition from this early form of brokerage to the rise
of patronage politics, especially vote-buying, but institutional and legal changes in
the years following the transition from Suharto’s regime have facilitated patronage
politics in elections for higher political offices. One of these changes involves
the role of political parties in electoral politics. Since the 2004 elections, the
Indonesian electoral system has become more candidate-centered, as those com-
peting for elected office increasingly rely on personal support instead of acquiring
support from party loyalists. Previously, candidates were chosen from party lists
and thus required support from the political parties to win office. Today, candi-
dates for local and legislative office frequently compete against members of their
own party on ballot lists where voters can choose individual candidates instead
of party-line voting. The candidate who wins the most votes, even if their name is
not first on the list of nominees from their party, will win the legislative seat. This
creates an incentive for candidates to compete for votes and, again, often find
themselves in competition against members of this own party.5 During this period,
the political parties began to disengage from mobilization efforts—including the
distribution of gifts and cash to voters—which lead to a system where candidates
took on the campaign responsibilities previously overseen by the parties during
the 2009 elections.6
Today, the overwhelming majority of candidates across Indonesia rely on
brokers as intermediaries between themselves and the voters.7 The term “broker”
is similar to the management literature in which brokers operate as an independent
agent used by industries.8 Because candidates are responsible for their own voter
mobilization efforts, they often rely on teams of professional consultants that
operate outside of the party structure (e.g., success teams). The necessity of
campaign teams, including brokers, is not simply a matter of professionalization
of candidate activity in Indonesian elections. There is also a long tradition of
candidates being distant from the voters, often having never visited the villages
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and cities they would represent. Thus, candidates are often distant from the local
communities and social networks that influence voting behavior in Indonesia,
which creates significant uncertainty among voters about the candidates’ cred-
ibility and their commitment to their respective communities.9 This requires
candidates to rely on brokers who are familiar with the villages and the voters
to establish personal and emotional connections with voters in order to win their
support. This is one reason why brokerage activity is far more frequent in village
elections and other local elections than provincial or presidential contests.10
Finally, despite economic development and urbanization over the past several
decades, most Indonesians still live in villages as opposed to larger cities.
A growing body of literature has sought to explain the activities and behavior of
brokers operating within this newly expanded candidate-centered political system
in Indonesia. The first serious effort to create a theoretical framework to explain
brokerage activity was Aspinall’s influential study about betrayal and loyalty of
brokers to their candidates.11 Because vote-buying is illegal in Indonesia, there
are no formal legal contracts between the candidates and the brokers responsible
for giving the money to voters. Thus, brokers can enrich themselves by simply
keeping the money intended for citizens (what Aspinall calls “predation”) or they
can join a rival campaign’s success team if that candidate offers better financial
incentives (what Aspinall calls “defection).12 In other situations, brokers can work
simultaneously for opposing candidates and distribute money on behalf of all the
candidates to voters, essentially nullifying the efforts of those campaigns.13
Aspinall’s theoretical model explains situations in which brokers are most
likely to betray their candidates (either through predation or defection) accord-
ing to the electoral prospects of a candidate as well as the financial resources
available to that candidate. Loyalty is most likely when the broker believes the
candidate has a good chance of winning the election and when that candidate has
fewer material resources to distribute to voters. Predation is most likely among
resource-rich campaigns that have less chance of winning, but it can can be found
among resource-rich campaigns in which the candidate is likely to win. Finally,
defection is most likely among resource-poor campaigns whose candidate has less
chance of winning the contest (p. 561). Other research has found that candidates
are deeply worried about betrayal by brokers and try to adopt methods of ensur-
ing loyalty. One candidate, for example, in the Pati Regency hired women brokers
because they were supposed to be more trustworthy.14 Other candidates in Central
Java attempted to closely monitor the voter lists supplied by brokers to ensure that
brokers were not including supporters of the rival campaign.15
These studies have suggested that one way for candidates to minimize the risk
of defection is to target brokers who have close personal ties to the candidate or
those who are community leaders. These types of brokers are generally (but not
always) thought to be less likely to betray the candidate and, partly because of them
not keeping the money, more effective at generating support for the candidate.
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Other research draws the comparison between “profit-oriented” brokers who are
more likely to betray their candidates versus “honest and loyal” brokers that “were
typically those who were tied to the candidate through a party or personal relation-
ship.”16 The predatory behavior among the “profit-driven” brokers resulted in the
money not being delivered to voters, resulting in fewer votes for the candidate.
The other side of brokerage effectiveness has to do with influence that the bro-
ker wields within his/her community. “The ultimate goal was to be able to connect
the candidate,” write Aspinall and Sukmajati, “at the apex of the pyramid [of suc-
cess team hierarchy], to the individual voters at the household level, and to do
so by way of brokers who had intimate relationships with those individuals.”17
Often candidates would recruit community leaders, including religious leaders, as
brokers precisely because of those leaders’ influence within their respective com-
munities. One study of East Java likewise found that candidates often attempted
to win support among leaders of social organizations and thereby tap into social
networks and the large numbers of voters that belong to them.18 These community
leaders have very close relationships with the voters in their areas, and they can
use this knowledge to influence voters or, at the very least, to notify the candidate
of significant shifts in support within their communities.
This growing body of research about brokerage behavior points to two impor-
tant points about broker loyalty. First, despite often-significant financial incen-
tives to betray a candidate, some brokers remain loyal because of close personal
(often family) ties to the candidate or the party. Such brokers could risk losing
status within their party or, worse, risk losing a friendship or creating dishar-
mony among family members by betraying the candidate. These personal costs
are significant enough that, for some brokers, they outweigh the financial gains
they would receive by defecting to another success team or keeping the money
intended for voters. Second, brokerage activity is deeply embedded in a social and
community environment. This is especially true in rural villages where, “tradi-
tional authority figures and social structures continue to wield considerable influ-
ence…with local notables being able to deliver blocs of votes in their commu-
nities.”19 Candidates seek out community leaders specifically for their influence
over and close relationships with the voters whose support the candidate wants.
One aspect of brokerage activity that has received less attention, however, is
the social cost of betrayal facing brokers within their local communities.20 Peo-
ple become leaders in their community because they are respected and trusted
by their neighbors and fellow members of the community. As our interviews and
field observations demonstrate below, these brokers often make public pronounce-
ments of support for a candidate well before Election Day. Some of their activity
involves negotiating with candidates for community projects and even the amount
of money that a candidate will provide to voters. Once a community leader has
committed to one candidate, the citizens of the community will know if that leader
defects to another campaign or fails to deliver the promised money to the voters.
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Such dishonest behavior can carry a very high social price in the form of loss of
trust within the community and even loss of business. Followers of a religious
leader who demonstrates dishonest behavior, for example, might leave and join
another mosque. In rural areas, business owners and religious leaders are often
consulted to resolve family disputes and other social conflicts. Behavior in the
political sphere that casts doubt on the person’s honesty and integrity could result
in a loss of social status within the community. Put simply, in several areas in
Indonesia, especially villages and rural areas (where vote buying and brokerage
behavior is most intense), behavior in the political sphere is not distinguishable
from behavior in other areas of society. This represents a significant cost in terms
of social status (and often business) to community leaders serving as brokers for
political campaigns.
Wewould note that while much of this discussion, as well as the analysis below,
focuses on vote-buying practices specifically, the social pressure and incentives
also extend to other brokerage activity such as endorsing candidates and rallying
supporters for the campaign. In rural areas of Central Java, a common campaign
theme involves the personal qualities of the candidate, such as trustworthiness,
religious devotion, and integrity. Brokers often attempt to convince voters through
appeals to these personal traits and brokers can easily undermine their respect
and trust within their local communities if they switch support in the middle of
a campaign, especially if it appears that the broker’s defection was the result of
higher payment from the rival candidate.
Case Selection and Methods
Criticism has been levied at small-N case studies for purposes of testing
hypotheses derived from social science theories.21 However, these methods also
have a strength for purposes of hypothesis formation and theory building,22 and
case-study methodology has become more broadly accepted and refined for these
purposes.23 This paper employs an exploratory case-study design to examine the
role that social status has on brokerage activity, especially betrayal versus loyalty
to a candidate. Because much of the activity involved with brokerage activity is
illegal in Indonesia, it is often difficult to acquire consent from candidates and
brokers to discuss their activities.
We relied upon established, long-standing connections with candidates, party
leaders, and brokers in two villages located in Central Java who were open to inter-
views and to allowing the authors to observe their activities in their respective vil-
lages. The Dukutalit Village has approximately 3,709 residents and is located in
the Juwana District within the Pati Regency. The Mranggen Village has approxi-
mately 17,524 residents and is located in the Mranggen District within the Demak
Regency.24 Thus, both villages are somewhat rural and both have a long history of
intense patronage politics, including vote buying that involves the use of brokers.
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We interviewed a total of 21 brokers who collectively worked for eight separate
candidates across four election cycles in both villages. The four elections included:
2011–2 regency head election (pilkada); 2015 regency head election (pilkada);
2012 village head election (pilkades); 2016 village head election (pilkades). All
eight of the candidates agreed to interviews and also to sharing information about
the brokers they had hired. The 21 brokers were selected to vary according to back-
ground and social status. Eight of the brokers were community leaders with back-
grounds ranging from former village leaders, religious leaders, business owners,
and independently wealthy individuals. The remaining 13 brokers were ordinary
citizens, most of them laborers, while approximately three to four were unem-
ployed or otherwise did not work regular jobs. Interviews and field observations
were conducted during the weeks prior to each election cycle, when brokerage
activity is most intense. We also conducted informal conversations with voters in
the two villages to verify that brokers had or had not shared money, the amounts
of money distributed, and other information provided by the candidates and
brokers.
“A Good Man in the Community”—Community Leaders and Broker
Loyalty
A candidate running for office in Demak, when asked about what kind of peo-
ple he desires as brokers, responded that he wanted “people who are part of a large
family, who have lots of friends, and have lots of influence…it is important that
they can influence people to vote for me.” He then quickly added, “also, he must be
a good man in the community…in order to trust them so that, sure, money will be
distributed [to the voters].” These two considerations—influence and honesty—
were common concerns raised by candidates during the interviews about the bro-
kers they sought for their success teams. More specifically, candidates looked for
brokers who had large social networks, were influential within their communities
(independent of social network size), and who had a “good” reputation within their
communities. The size of the personal network was obviously a concern because
it indicated more potential support for the candidate. Often brokers were sought
out because they were leaders of prominent civic, social, or business organiza-
tions with large memberships. Influence was cited by most of the candidates as a
potential measure of how effective the broker would be. Candidates would some-
times bypass leaders of large organizations in favor of community leaders who had
smaller social networks but nonetheless wielded significant influence over those
voters. This often included situations in which the relationship between the broker
was overtly clientelistic, such as a business owner with several employees or local
political leaders who gave government jobs to supporters as a reward for their loy-
alty. It also included religious leaders who could speak to the candidate’s honesty
and devoutness to their religion.
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Candidates also cited the broker’s reputation or the amount of respect the per-
son had amongmembers of their local communities, including howmuch the com-
munity trusts the person and the degree to which they view the broker as moral
and honest. While obviously this attribute is related to influence—a person who
is viewed as immoral and untrustworthy will have less influence over voters—
candidates talked about reputation as being different from influence. The concern
about honesty and trustworthiness was more strongly related to candidates’ con-
cerns about whether the broker could be trusted to work earnestly on behalf of the
candidate. Thus, the interviews with candidates strongly suggested that network
size and influence were about the effectiveness of the broker to gather support
while reputation was discussed more so (but not exclusively) in terms of broker
loyalty
Candidates were not only concerned about brokers keeping the money intended
for voters, but also about how hard the broker would work on behalf of the candi-
date. Brokers will often engage in mobilization activities such as going house-to-
house speaking directly with voters or organizing events that bring modest num-
bers of voters together so the broker can promote the candidate. For example, one
broker organized a gymnastics event the week prior to the election and invited the
candidate to attend. Another broker organized a pengajian forum (a religious stud-
ies gathering) that allowed the candidate to speak with local members about their
religious practices. This was in addition to brokers visiting directly with voters
and distributing money or gifts provided by the candidate. These activities high-
light the social nature of brokerage activity that extends beyond vote-buying and
other forms of patronage distributed to voters. Many brokers, in other words, are
not merely couriers who deliver goods to the public. Rather, many brokers are
also responsible for organizing community and religious activities that are used to
promoting their candidates’ involvement with the community and their personal
attributes such as generosity and religious devotion. When selecting brokers, can-
didates expressed a desire to have people on their success teams who could effec-
tively organize these types of events and who could effectively persuade voters to
support the candidate.
Given this wide range of brokerage activity, many candidates selected bro-
kers from diverse backgrounds and occupations. Two of the brokers interviewed,
for instance, are religious leaders in their village and were recruited because of
their connections to large religious organizations. Suparso, in contrast, is a local
entrepreneur who trades produce in the marketplace and employs a large num-
ber of workers. Other brokers are prominent leaders of large youth organizations
and had a large network of friends in their respective villages while another bro-
ker was a freelancer who is often hired for temporary construction projects and
other light work such as delivering goods. One broker, Nunung, is a housewife
and entrepreneur, but is also very active in pengajian forums. Candidates indi-
cated that they sought out brokers from a wide variety of backgrounds precisely
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because of the different groups of voters over whom they held influence. Hav-
ing multiple surrogates promoting the candidate within various social networks
expands the population of voters that the candidate can persuade, increasing their
chances of winning a largest percent of the vote on Election Day.
What all of these types of brokers have in common, however, is that they are
respected leaders within their communities. They have cultivated deep relation-
ships in their villages and spent years (often decades) establishing a reputation
of honesty and trustworthiness that breeds loyalty among members of their com-
munity and enhances their credibility. These brokers expressed significant concern
that citizens in their villages do not distinguish between political and non-political
activities. They feared that acting in a dishonest and untrustworthy manner during
the election—by defecting for another campaign or reneging on their promise to
distribute patronage provided by the candidate—would lead their neighbors and
friends to view them as dishonest and untrustworthy people in other aspects of
their lives.Moreover, they explained that such damage to their personal reputations
would have wide-ranging implications for their personal lives, potentially costing
them long-term friendships, status in their respective organizations, or even losing
customers for their businesses.
Some of these community leaders went to great lengths to protect their personal
reputations. In most cases, this meant maintaining their reputations at the expense
of financial incentives to defect to another candidate or keeping the sometimes
large sums of money distributed by the candidate. Among the brokers who were
also community leaders, this was not a difficult tradeoff because many of them are
personally wealthy and do not need the extra money. In one case that we observed,
the broker (whose surname is Sabeni) had agreed to work on his friend’s success
team. Sabeni was motivated by friendship and sought to elevate his status within
the community, not by financial incentives. Based on promises made by the candi-
date, Sabeni had publicly told voters in his village that theywould receive a specific
amount of cash from the candidate. Sabeni had hired his own team of brokers to
help distribute this money. On Election Night, however, the candidate reneged on
the promise and left Sabeni without any money to give to the voters. Sabeni paid
the brokers he hired with his own money and was left to apologize to the citizens
for the broken promise. The next election cycle, Sabeni worked for a different
candidate and distributed his own money to voters to help restore his reputation
following the broken promise. Sabeni’s also ended his friendship with the previ-
ous candidate because, according to Sabeni, the candidate was not honest with him
and the incident had damaged Sabeni’s reputation among the community.25
Surprisingly, winning the election was not an overriding concern among many
of these community leaders serving as brokers. Their motivations for serving on
success teams varied greatly, but a common theme was gaining social prestige or
positioning themselves for future campaigns in which they could occupy more
prestigious positions in the success team (which would also increase their social
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prestige). This required that they maintain their reputations within the community,
something that candidates indicated they valuedwhen hiring brokers. As discussed
above, Suparso believed that his commitment was not merely to the candidate but
also to the community at large. He feared a loss of reputation within his community
if he defected or was otherwise disloyal. Similarly, another broker surnamed Arief
cited the reaction by the community if he were to defect or betray the candidate.
“The people know that I committed to support this candidate,” he told us, “man
is based on his mouth; when he makes a promise, it is done.” Another broker,
Nunung, was not driven by financial motives at all. “I am just having fun, not to
seek money,” she said. Yet even Nunung mentioned social reputation as a reason
to remain loyal, claiming “I am not seduced by the money of the candidates; I
do not want to be embarrassed [by betraying the candidate].” In one instance, a
broker was very anxious because the candidate was late delivering the money to
him and declared in a somewhat hyperbolic manner, “I will not go home [to face
the voters] without money!”
In sum, our interviews and field observations revealed a common concern
among brokers who were community leaders and other prominent members of
their villages about the damage that betrayal could do to their social reputations
and even their businesses. The public nature of their work means that it would
be obvious to the community if they engaged in disloyal behavior during an elec-
tion, and the social environment in which this work occurs creates an extra cost
for betrayal in the form of damage to their personal and professional reputations
within the community. This makes betrayal by brokers who are community lead-
ers less likely even in situations where the incentive structure favors disloyalty.
For many brokers, put simply, the social costs outweigh the financial benefits of
betrayal.26 Moreover, many community leaders join a success team to raise their
prestige and status within their communities, and they often do so in order to gain
even more prestigious positions in future elections. An obvious betrayal, such as
keeping the money or failing to work earnestly to promote their candidate, would
be viewed negatively by future candidates who are seeking “a good man in the
community” that they can trust to remain loyal to them throughout the campaign.
If brokers who have deep roots in their local communities, who are not moti-
vated by financial gain, and who are concerned with maintaining their social status
in their communities are less likely to betray their candidates, why would candi-
dates not hire community leaders exclusively for their success teams? Part of the
answer lies in the small population of rural villages and legislative districts in
Central Java. Put simply, there are often fewer community leaders than candidates
running for office. The hiring of brokers is not a strict employer–employee rela-
tionship, especially at the higher levels of the success team organization. Candi-
dates seek out the most reputable and effective brokers and often these prospective
brokers will insist on meeting a candidate (or multiple candidates) before agreeing
to serve on their success team. The process can sometimes seem like the broker
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is interviewing the candidate more than the reverse. Moreover, these community
leaders frequently work for a single candidate at a time instead of working for
multiple campaigns. Thus, the supply of quality, trustworthy brokers is often much
lower than the demand for their services.
Another reason why candidates would entrust their money with less reputable
brokers involves the social backgrounds of the community leaders. Religious lead-
ers especially are sometimes reluctant to distribute money and gifts to voters
because of the illegal nature of the practice. Two of the brokers that we inter-
viewed, for example, were religious leaders. One of them, Arief, talked with vot-
ers about certain forms of patronage, such as the candidate’s promise to provide
resources to build a mosque in the village, but refused to give money directly to
the voters. He felt that it would be considered taboo for a leader to openly engage
in criminal behavior in front of his followers. The other broker, however, did dis-
tribute money directly to members of his organization but expressed worry about
losing respect among those members. Thus, among the more trustworthy and rep-
utable brokers, at least some of them are hired with the understanding that they will
not be the ones distributing cash on Election Day. This was true of about half of the
community leaders that we interviewed for this study. Candidates must therefore
sometimes hire other, less reputable individuals to act as “couriers” to distribute
themoney.We found that betrayal was far more common (although not ubiquitous,
as we examine in the next section) among these “non-elite” or “courier” brokers
than among those who were community leaders that were more concerned with
their social reputations.
“Here is a Shipwreck”—Couriers and Broker Disloyalty
The problem of broker disloyalty has been described as, “a sense that one’s
operatives in the neighborhoods, towns and boroughs may be parasites and traitors
is omnipresent”27 This perception and concern about loyalty stems from the ille-
gal nature of vote buying in Indonesia and the expansive nature of success teams.
Because the practice is illegal, there are no official contracts between the candi-
dates and the brokers, and thus there are no legal ramifications for betrayal. A
candidate who reports the “theft” of his money to police will be admitting to a
criminal act himself—attempting to distribute money in exchange for people’s
votes. Moreover, success teams are extremely hierarchical and are often massive
organizations. Especially in large rural areas (such as Central Java), it is very dif-
ficult for candidates to engage in oversight of success team members. One study
found that some candidates attempt to oversee brokerage activity through super-
vision, even to the point of having a trusted advisor follow the broker when the
money is distributed while other candidates excerpt looser control over brokers.28
Less oversight, according to this study, led to greater opportunities for betrayal by
brokers.
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The lack of control and oversight can also be partly traced to the distant nature
of some candidates who run for office in districts or villages they rarely visit. The
detachment from the local community can make it difficult for these candidates to
know which individuals are the most trustworthy and reputable. Moreover, as dis-
cussed in the previous section, these candidates often fail to convince the commu-
nity leaders to join their teams and are thus forced to rely on other individuals. And
even when they attract reputable members of the community, there are instances
where the brokers (especially religious leaders) will be reluctant to distribute the
money to voters. Thus, candidates are often forced to rely on individuals who have
lower social status and reputations within their communities to act as “couriers”
for their campaign.
In our interviews with these “non-elite” or “courier” brokers, we found a wide
range of motivations and perspectives about their participation in the success
teams. Some were motivated out of party loyalty or personal connections to the
candidate (sometimes including clientelistic relationships), while others appeared
to be predominantly motivated by the financial incentives that the candidates were
offering. There was also variation in the level of concern among these “courier”
brokers regarding their reputations within their local communities. Two examples
of especially egregious disloyalty involve brokers surnamed Bayu and Sarmin.
Bayu acted as a “double agent” by simultaneously working for two opposing can-
didates to distribute money on their behalf. On Election Day, Bayu only distributed
the money for one of the candidates and not the other while keeping the money
he was paid by both candidates for his work. The candidate that Bayu betrayed
was not able to find a replacement broker at the last minute. Sarmin, on the other
hand, defected from his original candidate for a rival campaign and, while he did
distribute money on behalf of the rival candidate, his defection created problems
for the original candidate to whom he committed. Sarmin cited the reason for his
defection in simple terms—“Here is a shipwreck…he gave me more.” A “ship-
wreck” is Indonesian slang for finding a large amount of money. Both brokers
cited the financial incentives as reasons for their betrayal of the candidates.
Bayu and Sarmin are not leaders in their community, are not wealthy, and gen-
erally are regarding as occupying a lower social status in their village. Nor were
they hired to promote the candidates through social organizations or community
events. They were simply hired by the campaigns to deliver the money and were
promised a salary in exchange. This “courier” type of brokers is most common
at the lower levels of the success teams, especially when higher-level brokers are
unwilling to distribute the money themselves. In contrast to the community lead-
ers discussed in the previous section, Bayu and Sarmin were less concerned by
the negative perceptions that their behavior created among members of the com-
munity. In fact, Bayu’s behavior did not come as a surprise to the community
considering that he had a reputation for disloyal and dishonest behavior from past
campaigns. Even members of his own family acknowledged this past behavior and
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were aware that he was acting as a “double agent.” Bayu and Sarmin were both
aware that the community would view their actions as a breach of social norms,
and they were aware that there was a social expectation among their community
that they should remain loyal to their original candidate. Both brokers intimated
that their social and financial circumstances would not greatly suffer as a conse-
quence of violating these social norms. Because they had little to lose socially, and
much to gain financially (especially considering that their regular salaries were not
very high), the benefit of defection and predation outweighed the cost in loss of
social reputations that were already not very high.
While the majority of the “courier” brokers that we interviewed engaged in
some form of betrayal—either defection or predation—we did find some interest-
ing cases of loyalty to the candidate. Two of the cases involved clientelistic rela-
tionships with higher-level brokers. Brokers hired at higher levels in the success
team often hire friends, family members, and employees to work under them and
help distribute the money in lower level electoral districts.29 Two of the “courier”
brokers (surnamed Sofwan and Sobar) that we interviewed, for example, worked
as laborers for two of the “community leader” brokers that we interviewed. Dur-
ing the election, both brokers dutifully shared the money with voters and indi-
cated their loyalty was to their respective employers, not necessarily the candi-
dates. Where the “courier” brokers had familiar or business relations with the
higher-level “community leader” brokers, betrayals were much rarer than among
“courier” brokers who had no similar relations with their superiors on the success
teams or with their respective candidates. These brokers were only hired as couri-
ers to distribute the money to voters and, because they did not have positions of
high social status within their communities, had the best opportunity to keep the
money for themselves or to defect to a success team that paid them a higher salary.
Yet they also had to consider the social risk of harming family relationships, per-
sonal friendships, and even the prospect of harming their employment prospects
as a result of such betrayal.
Conclusion
Our study of elections in two Central Java villages has examined the social set-
ting in which brokerage activity occurs and its influence on the loyalty brokers dis-
play toward candidates during an election. The interviews and field observations
from these two villages demonstrate how social reputation and the social environ-
ment can act as an intervening mechanism that, in some instances, can override
the powerful financial incentives for brokers to betray their candidates (both defec-
tion and predation). In particular, community leaders who serve as brokers have
an additional cost—loss of reputation and even business within their communi-
ties – to consider when deciding whether to remain loyal to the candidate who
has hired them. Even among brokers hired simply as couriers to distribute the
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money and who hold positions of lower social status in their communities, there
are sometimes strong clientelistic relationships they must consider before defect-
ing to another success team or keeping the money intended for voters.
In highlighting the role of the social environment in shaping brokers’ loyalty,
we are not minimizing nor dismissing the powerful financial incentives that can
tempt brokers to betray their candidates. Aspinall’s influential theory and more
recent studies of brokerage activity in Indonesia represent the first serious efforts
to explain broker loyalty in a systematicmanner. The financial and electoral factors
identified by this growing body of literature are extremely important explanations
for broker loyalty. Our argument is simply that these factors interact with the social
environment in ways that can sometimes create situations in which brokers who
otherwise might betray their candidates nonetheless remain loyal to them. “Loy-
alty” in this case refers to the decision by brokers to fulfill the job they were hired
to do—organize community events, persuade voters to support the candidate, dis-
tribute money to voters, and so forth. It does not necessarily indicate an altruistic
or moral decision by brokers; it simply means that they have fulfilled the tasks for
which they were hired by the campaign to complete. Absent their concerns about
loss of social reputation (or even business), future work on upcoming campaigns,
or damage to friendships and family relations, many of the “community leader”
brokers might have chosen to betray their candidates.
We also found some tentative evidence that the candidate-broker relationship is
more nuanced and complex than previous studies have suggested. Previous stud-
ies tend to give the impression of brokers as analogous to employees hired by the
candidate to complete certain tasks. Yet the case of Sabeni, along with comments
by other “community leader” brokers that we interviewed, suggests that a lot of
these brokers interview the candidate as much, if not more so, than the reverse.
Community leaders who agree to join a success team risk damaging their repu-
tations within their village if the candidate breaks his promise to give money to
voters or to donate to local projects. Some of these brokers would actually incur
large financial losses in order to maintain their reputations within their respective
communities if a candidate broke their promises to voters regarding distributing
money. Thus, community leaders must also consider the trustworthiness of the
candidates and their ability to deliver the goods promised to voters before agreeing
to join their success teams. This represents a more complex dynamic of broker-
age behavior and suggests that some types of brokers (e.g., community leaders)
are selective about which success teams they join during an election cycle. Put
simply, instead of simply being employees of a campaign, certain types of brokers
might have much more power in the candidate-broker relationship than previously
thought.
Moreover, the cases of Sofwan and Sobar further suggest that power dynamics
between brokers at different layers in the success team hierarchy could be more
complex and clientelistic in nature. What appears to be loyalty to the candidate by
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a “courier” broker could, in some instances, actually be loyalty to an employer or a
familymember. This has the potential to create a compounding effect, as disloyalty
by higher-level brokers results in lower-level brokers following the lead of the
employer or family member who hired them. Thus, a candidate who hires brokers
for higher-level positions in the success team must also be concerned about the
“couriers” who were hired to work under them. Clientelistic relationships between
brokers at different levels of the success team hierarchy would seem especially
prone to these types of mass defections or betrayals.
Our findings also have implications for understanding patronage politics,
especially vote-buying behavior, outside of Indonesia. The role of community
leaders in vote buying has received some mention in studies of patronage politics
in other countries. One study examined reciprocity and vote-buying in Paraguay,
noting that, “politicians hire respected community leaders in each village to
interact with voters to promote their candidacy and offer them money and other
forms of aid in exchange for the promise of their vote.”30 Likewise, vote brokers
in Taiwan, “were usually recruited among individuals with significant influence
within their community (such as village heads, businessmen, or teachers)—that
is, among any social group able to deliver a block of votes.”31 This included
criminal gang leaders who both had deep ties in local communities and corrupt
relationships with local government that shielded them from prosecution. Thus,
the use of community leaders and other prominent leaders is somewhat common
in various countries experiencing patronage politics and vote buying practices.
The various and sometimes conflicting incentives among brokers that are hired to
promote a candidate can create different patterns of loyalty toward the candidate.
Future research could examine the interplay of social and financial incentives
that influence broker loyalty and the various power dynamics involved between
brokers and candidates as well as between brokers of different social status and
positions in campaign hierarchies.
Finally, the interviews and field observations presented above are from two vil-
lages located in two regencies in Central Java that cover four local and village
elections. While the villages are fairly typical of their respective regencies and
represent the two largest cultural groups in Java, the analysis presented is obvi-
ously not representative of the entire island of Java, let alone the entire nation of
Indonesia. It is possible that brokerage activity varies across Indonesia in terms of
its frequency and intensity as well as the different tasks that brokers are expected to
perform during the campaign. Citizens might also differ in terms of social expec-
tations in some parts of Indonesia compared to Central Java and the two villages
examined in this paper. The goal of this paper is not to make sweeping decla-
rations and generalizations about brokerage behavior across a large and diverse
nation such as Indonesia. Instead, the goal is to examine the ways in which the
social environment interacts with financial and electoral factors to help provide a
fuller and more nuanced understanding of brokerage behavior.
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